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The Case in Support of Restaurant Hygiene 
Grade Cards
By Ginger Zhe Jin and Phillip Leslie
Throughout the United States, consumers rely on local
health authorities to regulate and inspect restaurants in an
attempt to assure that high-quality hygiene standards are
maintained. Few people would argue that this is unimpor-
tant. If hygiene were left unregulated and unmonitored, it
is likely that restaurant workers would shirk in their efforts
to maintain good hygiene, and customers would generally
have little idea that their meals may have been prepared
without meeting appropriate health standards. Of course,
not all restaurants would be irresponsible in this way, but
it only takes one shirking restaurant to give rise to a public
health emergency.
How effective are the regulations and inspections by
public health authorities at assuring good-quality restau-
rant hygiene? We have studied restaurant hygiene and the
role played by health inspections in Los Angeles County
over a three-year period (1996–1998). Our research indi-
cates that restaurant hygiene regulations and inspections
are a fairly imperfect device for assuring good-quality
hygiene. However, in January 1998 the Department of
Health Services (DHS) in Los Angeles implemented a crit-
ical change in their regulations that led to a dramatic
improvement in restaurant hygiene—restaurants were
henceforth required to display prominently in their win-
dow a letter-grade card (A, B, or C) corresponding to the
result of their most recent DHS hygiene inspection. We
analyzed a variety of different data to assess the effects of
these grade cards on restaurant hygiene, restaurant reve-
nue, restaurant prices and output, behavior of DHS
inspectors, and, most importantly, the occurrence of food-
related illnesses. We also explored the differential effects of
the grade cards on different types of restaurants.
Weak Incentives for Good Hygiene in the Absence of 
Grade Cards
Before the grade cards were introduced in Los Angeles,
DHS inspectors would randomly inspect restaurants about
twice a year. During these inspections, the inspector would
explain to the restaurant staff where violations occurred,
tell them to fix these problems, and offer general advice on
how to maintain good hygiene. Restaurants were given a
score out of 100, with prespecified points being deducted
for each violation. For example, a food temperature viola-
tion results in a five-point deduction, and evidence of
cockroaches results in a three-point deduction. However,
there are no fines for these violations, and a restaurant is
only closed in severe cases such as an infestation, or if a res-
taurant received two consecutive scores below 60. Even
then, it would be closed only for the time it took to fix the
problems. Hence, a restaurant could consistently have
many violations and incur little penalty. Furthermore, the
assigned hygiene scores were not made available to the
public.
It would be wrong to argue that restaurants had zero
incentives to maintain good hygiene in the absence of
grade cards. On the regulatory side, inspectors provide
education about safe food-handling practices and require
at least one certified food handler be present in each res-
taurant. This probably causes some hygiene improve-
ments. On the consumer side, consumers are not
completely ignorant about restaurants’ hygiene qualities.
Consumers may observe some aspects of restaurant
hygiene (such as bathroom cleanliness). Consumers may
also learn from experience and form beliefs over time
about the hygiene at certain restaurants. These consumer
beliefs may provide incentives for restaurants to form and
maintain reputations for providing good hygiene.
In search of evidence of reputational incentives for res-
taurant hygiene, we measured a restaurant’s hygiene condi-
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tion by the average hygiene scores
across all the inspections that restau-
rant received before graded cards. We
found that chain-affiliated restau-
rants develop reputations for good
hygiene quality, which provides an
incentive to maintain good hygiene,
leading to better hygiene than non-
chain restaurants on average (Jin &
Leslie, 2005). We also showed that
franchised chain restaurants tend to
have lower hygiene quality than com-
pany-owned chain restaurants, indi-
cating that franchised units tend to
free-ride on the chain reputation to
some extent.
There is also variation across
neighborhoods in the degree of
repeat customers at restaurants,
which affects the ability of restau-
rants to form reputations. For exam-
ple, in locations with many tourists
(who are not repeat customers), res-
taurants may be less able to develop
reputations for good hygiene; hence,
these restaurants tend to have worse
hygiene. Our analysis showed that
regional variation in the degree of
repeat business has a significant effect
on restaurant hygiene quality.
We concluded that hygiene regu-
lations and inspections (without
posted grade cards), as well as free-
market reputation mechanisms, pro-
vide some degree of incentives for
restaurants to maintain good-quality
hygiene. However, these incentives
are likely weak, as many aspects of
restaurant hygiene are unobservable
to consumers, and inspectors cannot
punish a restaurant for violations if
the restaurant’s hygiene score is above
60. This may be why only 25% of
restaurants in Los Angeles had the
equivalent of A-grade hygiene before
the grade cards were introduced in
1998.
Grade Cards Lead to a Reduction 
in Food-Related Illnesses
By posting grade cards in restaurant
windows in 1998 in Los Angeles, the
DHS increased the provision of
information to consumers about res-
taurant hygiene quality. From a pub-
lic health point of view, the key
question is whether the increased
information generates any improve-
ment in health outcomes. An ideal
answer to this question requires data
on the number of people who get
sick from eating at restaurants. But,
obviously, most people get sick and
spend an unpleasant day at home
without this being recorded by any
kind of authority. Even when there is
a visit to a doctor, it is not recorded
in a central database of such inci-
dents.
However, in California we have
access to data on people who are
admitted to hospitals. This data
comes from the California Office of
Statewide Health and Planning
Development. Using this data, we
observed the number of people
admitted to hospitals with specific
diagnoses each month in each three-
digit zip code for the period January
1993 to 2000. We determined which
diagnoses were almost certainly due
to unsafe food by following the crite-
ria of a prior study (Mead et al.,
1999) and independently with the
help of medical specialists.
We used the data for all periods
before and after the grade cards were
introduced. We compared the num-
ber of food-related hospitalizations in
the zip codes in Los Angeles to (a)
the number of hospitalizations for
non-food-related digestive disorders
in zip codes in Los Angeles and (b)
the number of hospitalizations for
food-related illnesses in zip codes in
the rest of California. Our approach
was to estimate a regression model in
which the dependent variable was the
log of the number of people admitted
to hospital with a particular kind of
diagnosis in a particular month and
zip code. The independent variables
were binary indicators for each zip
code and illness-type combination,
binary indicators for year and month,
and a binary variable equal to one for
zip codes in Los Angeles after the
introduction of grade cards.
Estimating this regression model,
we found that the introduction of
grade cards in January 1998 in Los
Angeles corresponded to a 20%
decrease in the number of people
admitted to hospitals with food-
related illnesses. The estimate is sig-
nificantly different from zero with
99% confidence. This was a discrete
change exactly at the time of the
grade cards, leading us to suspect
strongly that this reduction in food-
borne illnesses was because of the
grade cards.
Remember, this finding was
based on data for hospitalizations.
These were very sick people that
needed to spend at least one night in
hospital. It is unclear whether grade
cards affected less severe cases of
food-related illness. It is conceivable
this broader effect may be either
larger or smaller than 20%. We do
not know the answer to this.
There are two ways the grade
cards may lead to improved health
outcomes. First, the grade cards may
cause restaurants to make actual
hygiene improvements. Second, they
enable consumers to substitute
demand away from poor-hygiene res-
taurants in favor of good-hygiene res-
taurants. Under the second
mechanism, even if restaurants make
no actual improvements, we could
still find a decrease in the incidence
of food-related illnesses. We refer to
this as a sorting effect, because con-
sumers sort themselves across restau-
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rants with different hygiene grades.
From the point of view public health,
it does not matter if only the sorting
effect applies. However, it would be
interesting to know whether the
grade cards cause restaurants to make
actual improvements, which also
contribute to the apparent improve-
ment in health outcomes.
We developed a model of con-
sumer sorting, which we estimated
using the combined revenue and
inspection grades data. Specifically,
we obtained permission from the
California State Board of Equaliza-
tion to access confidential sales-tax
data for all restaurants in Los Angeles
county in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
This data allowed us to infer each res-
taurants’ quarterly revenues during
this period. We matched this data to
the DHS hygiene inspection scores of
each restaurant over the same period
of time.
In order to disentangle consumer
sorting effects from actual hygiene
improvements by restaurants, we sep-
arated restaurants into three
groups—A, B, and C or below—
according to their hygiene scores
before grade cards. Suppose each
group represents a specific risk of
food-borne illnesses, and restaurant
revenue is a good proxy for consumer
flows to these restaurants. If posted
grade cards generated no actual
improvement in restaurant hygiene,
but motivated consumers to sort into
better restaurants, the improvement
in foodborne hospitalization should
follow a specific pattern, given res-
taurant revenues and the risk of food-
borne illnesses in each type of
restaurant. If the actual health
improvement exceeds the predicted
sorting effects, it is likely due to
actual hygiene improvement by res-
taurants. Using econometric tech-
niques, we showed that both effects
do in fact contribute to the decrease
in food-related-illness hospitaliza-
tions. Full details are available in Jin
and Leslie (2003).
Grade Cards Magnify Economic 
Incentives for Good-Quality 
Hygiene
The above analysis suggests that res-
taurant owners have made efforts to
improve hygiene after the introduc-
tion of grade cards. We argue that
this is because grade cards magnify
economic incentives for good-qual-
ity hygiene.
The 1996–1998 revenue data
allowed us to analyze whether con-
sumers are responsive to the grade
cards. We found that before the grade
cards, changes in restaurants’ hygiene
quality (as measured by the DHS
inspection scores) had no impact on
restaurant revenue. This is consistent
with consumers having limited abil-
ity to assess restaurant hygiene. After
the grade cards were implemented, if
a restaurant received an A grade, their
revenue increased by 5.7% relative to
their revenue when there were no
grade cards. For restaurants that
received a B grade, revenue increased
by 0.7%. For a C grade, revenue
decreased by 1%.
The analysis of the revenue data
verifies that after grade cards, con-
sumers become sensitive to restaurant
hygiene when choosing which restau-
rants to patronize. Critics of the
grade cards argue that consumers
may be misled—the fact that a res-
taurant obtained an A during an
inspection does not ensure the res-
taurant has A-grade hygiene at other
times. This is true. However, before
the grade-card system was imple-
mented in Los Angeles, the average
difference in DHS inspection scores
between two randomly chosen res-
taurants was 13.5. Meanwhile, the
average difference in scores between
two randomly chosen inspections at a
single randomly chosen restaurant
was only 8.8. The point is that there
tends to be much greater variation in
hygiene across different restaurants
than there is at any individual restau-
rant over time. Hence, although
grade cards don’t assure consumers
that the restaurant has the posted
grade at other times, they provide
valuable information about which
restaurants are more likely to have
better hygiene. Grade cards are an
informative, although imperfect, sig-
nal.
The revenue analysis also suggests
that restaurants may actually benefit
from the grade cards. The impact on
revenue varies according to the grade
and is positive for A and B-grade res-
taurants. Revenue is not the same
thing as profit, and we have no infor-
mation on the cost for restaurants to
obtain an A or B. As noted above,
about 25% of restaurants already had
the equivalent of A-grade hygiene, so
for these restaurants there was only
upside to the grade cards. Some res-
taurants will incur significant costs to
improve hygiene to become an A or
B, and in these cases it is conceivable
the grade cards have reduced their
profits. However, these are the worst
hygiene offenders, so policymakers
may be unsympathetic with these res-
taurants.
The grade cards stimulate
demand for good-hygiene restau-
rants, raising the possibility that res-
taurants may also increase prices,
which would be bad for consumers.
Revenue equals price times quantity,
and so the fact that revenue has
increased at good restaurants implies
we can only rule out the possibility
that both price and quantity have
fallen. It could be that price has
increased and quantity has fallen,
with a net positive impact on reve-
nue.
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We are unaware of restaurant-
level data on prices. To shed light on
the possible impact of the grade cards
on prices, we examined price indices
constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Specifically, we looked at
the monthly price index for “food
away from home” in the combined
region of Los Angeles, Riverside, and
Orange counties (LRO). This is the
least aggregated price index available
that includes Los Angeles restaurant
prices. Note that Los Angeles has
more than twice the combined popu-
lation of Riverside and Orange coun-
ties. We compared this index with
the same product category in regions
other than LRO1 and with other
consumer price indices2 within LRO.
The data cover the time period Janu-
ary 1991 to February 2001.
In separate regressions we exam-
ine the dependent variables: (a) prices
over time for food away from home
in various regions and (b) prices over
time for various goods categories
within LRO. Explanatory variables
were a grade-card dummy (1 for food
away from home in LRO in all
months after January 1998) and
binary indicators for year, month,
region, and goods category. The level
of the price index for food away from
home in LRO in December 1997 is
171.1. In the cross-region regression,
the coefficient on grade cards was
estimated to be -2.14, suggesting a
1.25% price drop in LRO after 1998
as compared to non-LRO regions. In
the cross-categories regression, the
coefficient on grade cards was esti-
mated to be -5.78, suggesting a
3.38% drop in the price of food away
from home as compared to other
industries within LRO. In both cases,
the estimates are statistically different
from zero with 99% confidence.
Because revenue is equal to price
times quantity, an overall increase in
restaurant revenue and a decrease in
the price index suggests that output
may have increased after grade cards.
This conjecture is confirmed when
we compare the total number of peo-
ple employed in the food industry in
and out of Los Angeles county, as
well as before and after graded cards
within Los Angeles county. (More
details are available at Jin and Leslie,
2003). Decreased price and increased
output may be explained by the
grade cards lowering search costs for
consumers, leading to more intense
competition among restaurants. In
other words, the grade cards make
consumers more confident about try-
ing restaurants they have not experi-
enced before and make them less
captive to the restaurants they have
had good experiences at.
Grade Cards Make Inspectors 
Slightly More Lenient
The revenue analysis verified that the
restaurant hygiene grade cards create
an economic incentive for restaurants
to obtain an A grade. However, these
incentives may also affect the behav-
ior of inspectors, probably because
the grade cards cause restaurant man-
agers to pressure inspectors during an
inspection. In our conversations with
DHS inspectors, it was clear that
inspectors feel much more pressure
from restaurants than they did before
the grade cards. For example, an
unhappy restaurant manager may
complain of discrimination by the
inspector. This is of course not sur-
prising—restaurants will do what
they can to obtain an A; this includes
improving hygiene as well as pressur-
ing inspectors.
Some evidence is highly sugges-
tive that the grade cards cause inspec-
tors to become more lenient in their
inspections. Before the grade cards,
the distribution of inspection scores
was a smooth bell-shaped distribu-
tion. After the introduction of grade
cards, there is a dramatic upward
spike in the distribution at the score
of 90, which is the cut-off score for
obtaining an A grade. There is also a
downward spike at 89. A similar pat-
tern occurs around the cut-off for a B
grade.
One interpretation of this pat-
tern, which is also consistent with the
anecdotal evidence from inspectors,
is that inspectors choose to “bump
up” a score of 89 to 90 so that the
restaurant is not punished because of
one point. As long as inspectors do
not bump up restaurants which
deserve even lower scores, this is a
mild form of grade inflation. How-
ever, monitoring from the DHS is
needed to ensure that the grade infla-
tion does not become worse over
time.
A final point of interest: Before
the grade cards, the average DHS
inspection score for restaurants in
locations where residents have
income below the Los Angeles
median was 74.5. For restaurants in
locations with income above the
median, the average score was 78.8.
In the first year after the grade cards,
the averages increased to 89.8 and
89.5, respectively. Hence, grade cards
appear to be particularly effective at
improving restaurant hygiene in low-
income areas.
1. Comparison regions include 
San Francisco-Oakland-San 
Jose counties, Chicago-Gary-
Kenosha counties, and New 
York-Northern New Jersey-
Long Island counties.
2. Comparison industries include 
food at home, alcoholic bever-
ages, and all items.
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Conclusion and Further Thoughts
In conclusion, the use of restaurant
hygiene grade cards in Los Angeles
has been a great success. By increas-
ing the provision of information to
consumers, powerful economic
incentives are created for restaurants
to improve hygiene, leading to a sig-
nificant improvement in public
health outcomes. Moreover, because
the DHS already perform inspec-
tions, the grade cards create negligi-
ble additional cost for the
government.
Three factors seem to have con-
tributed to the successful implemen-
tation of the grade cards in Los
Angeles County. First, the grade-card
policy was adopted in response to a
three-part report aired on CBS 2
News on the Los Angeles-based
Channel 2000 on November 16–18,
1997. The report, “Behind the
Kitchen Door,” used hidden cameras
to show viewers unsanitary restaurant
kitchens. The TV exposé had an
immediate influence—it raised con-
sumer awareness about restaurant
hygiene, highlighted the weakness of
the existing system, and added politi-
cal pressure for regulatory change.
A second key factor is the format
of the grade cards. There are many
ways to disseminate hygiene inspec-
tion results. Rather than issue a grade
card to be displayed in the front win-
dow of a restaurant, Los Angeles
County government could publicize
the inspection reports online (which
has been adopted recently in New
York City) or require every restaurant
owner to provide the most recent
hygiene report if a consumer asks for
it (which is the state law of Califor-
nia). The policy of  “available upon
request” was apparently insufficient
for maintaining good restaurant
hygiene. This was confirmed by
Tribbey (2005), who reported a very
low degree of compliance with the
state law in Napa, CA. As for internet
posting, we are not aware of any
study examining the impact of publi-
cizing inspection reports in an online
database. Arguably, grade cards reach
more consumers and are more readily
available to consumers than an inter-
net database. According to what we
have seen in Los Angeles County,
wide access to the inspection results
plays a critical role in enhancing con-
sumer awareness of restaurant
hygiene, thus reinforcing the eco-
nomic incentives for restaurants to
improve hygiene quality.
Within the format of grade cards,
the DHS could print the numerical
inspection score instead of a simple
letter grade on the card. In fact, some
counties in North Carolina have
adopted a “Know the Score” pro-
gram, which indicates that grade
cards must show the letter grade and
numeric score in the same size type,
side by side (Pytka, 2005). Posting
the numerical score may give more
information to consumers and allevi-
ate inspector bias around the cutoff
of the letter grades. However, it may
also entail more education efforts to
ensure that consumers understand
the details behind the numerical
scores. We are not aware of any study
evaluating the “Know the Score” pro-
gram, but the experience in Los
Angeles County suggests that letter
grades have a clear interpretation to
consumers, which is essential for con-
sumers to pay attention to grade
cards. Nevertheless, it would be use-
ful future research to examine the
issue of what is the ideal form of
information to provide consumers.
A third factor contributing to the
success of grade cards is the assess-
ment criteria. In Los Angeles, inspec-
tors follow rigid codes that relate
specific violations to carefully defined
numerical point deductions. By min-
imizing the subjective component in
hygiene inspections, the criteria help
standardize evaluations across restau-
rants and inspectors, helping to
encourage consumer confidence in
the grade cards. Of course, this does
not mean the Los Angeles assessment
criteria are perfect. There have been
concerns that the current criteria in
Los Angeles may not reflect the true
hygiene conditions and may not give
appropriate weights to certain aspects
of restaurant hygiene. Although we
are unaware of any specific evidence
indicating the inspection criteria in
Los Angeles may be imperfect, this is
surely a topic for ongoing evaluation
by public health specialists in Los
Angeles as well as the rest of the
United States.
Finally, restaurant hygiene regula-
tions fall within the jurisdiction of
local governments (to the best of our
knowledge). In the case of Los Ange-
les, the inspections are carried out by
county health inspectors, but at least
some of the regulations are at the dis-
cretion of each city government. For
example, the policy of mandatory
posting of grade cards that we have
studied was a decision made sepa-
rately by each city government in Los
Angeles County. At the other end of
the spectrum, the federal government
provides guidelines for retail food
handling, which are voluntary for
local governments to adopt (Food
and Drug Administration, 2001).
Our research suggests that standard-
ized assessment criterion and manda-
tory posting of grade cards for every
city in the United States would pro-
vide significant public health bene-
fits. We cannot help but wonder if
the federal government could play a
more active role in this respect.
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